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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, and particularly since 1998, there has been an
incredible transformation in the treatment of sex-based and genderbased violence' in the fields of international humanitarian law and
international criminal law. Before this, crimes committed exclusively
or disproportionately against women and girls, in times of conflict, were
largely either ignored, or at most, treated as secondary to other crimes.2
Despite the fact that rape and other forms of sexual violence had been
widely reported during World War HI, for instance, the crime of rape
was not expressly included in either the London Charter, establishing
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expanded version of remarks presented at a conference on "Gender, War & Peace: Women's
Statues in the Wake of Conflict," hosted by Michigan State University College of Law on
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InternationalLaw.
1. As leading commentators on international crimes against women have noted,
"Gender-based crimes, reflected primarily in socially constructed roles, manifestations, and
stereotypes, and sex-based crimes, reflected primarily in biological differences, to a great extent
overlap and intersect." Dorean M. Koening & Kelly D. Askin, InternationalCriminalLaw: The
International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes Against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 5 (Askin and Koening eds., 2000). However, there is an
increasing trend to use these terms more precisely. Id. Nevertheless, confusion remains as the
terms still lack universally accepted definitions and are often subject to different meanings,
usages and interpretations. Id.
2. See Kelly D. Askin, ProsecutingWartime Rape andOther Gender-RelatedCrimes
UnderInternationalLaw: ExtraordinaryAdvances, Enduring Obstacles,21 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 288, 294-96 (2003) [hereinafter Prosecuting Wartime Rape]; ANNE TIERNEY GOLDSTEIN,

2 (1993)
("When ... atrocities are perpetrated against men, or against women in the same form as they
are perpetrated against men, they constitute and are universally recognized as war crimes....
But when they are committed against women in the form of sexual abuse, no matter how
perfectly they fit the legal definition of a particular war crime, historically they have been
treated as less serious than nonsexual atrocities.").
RECOGNIZING FORCED IMPREGNATION AS A WAR CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
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the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg 3 or the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at
Tokyo.4 In fact, the term rape is completely absent from the 179-page
judgment of the IMT at Nuremberg,5 and while rape was prosecuted in
Tokyo, its prosecution was viewed as ancillary to other war crimes.6
Moreover, while rape was recognized as a violation of the law of war
as far back as at least the fifteenth century- when "27 judges of the
Holy Roman Empire judged and condemned Peter von Hagenbach...
because he allowed his troops to rape and kill innocent civilians"' international humanitarian law has traditionally linked sexual violence
with crimes against honor or dignity, rather than with crimes of
violence. For instance, Article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention
relating to the protection of civilian persons during time of war states
that "[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their
honour, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of
indecent assault."8 Similarly, Article 14 of the third Geneva Convention
relating to the treatment of prisoners of war states that "[w]omen shall
be treated with all the regarddue to their sex."9 Although the phrase
remains largely undefined, the commentary to the Convention notes that
when interpreting the provision, the following should be borne in mind:

3.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279,

reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

available at
(1947),
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
4. Charter for the International Military Tribunal of the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, reprinted in TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL (R. John Pritchard & Sonia
Magbanuz Zaide eds., 1981), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter].
5. Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing The
International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 649, 665 (1995).
BEFORE

6.

M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL

LAW 348 (1999).
7. G. SCHWARTZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 462 (1968), cited in M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an
International CriminalCourt, 1 IND. INT. &COMP. LREv. 1 (1991).
8. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 74 U.N.T.S. 287, 306 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] (emphasis
added).
9. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, [hereinafter Geneva Convention IH] (emphasis added).
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...B. Honour and modesty.-The main intention [being] to defend women
prisoners against rape, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.l"

However, overwhelming evidence of the systematic raping of women
in conflicts over the last decade has helped to create unprecedented
levels of awareness of rape as a method of war and political repression.
As a result, great strides have been made in the condemnation and
prosecution of sex-based and gender-based violence. Indeed, rape and
other forms of sexual violence have been successfully prosecuted as war
crimes,11 crimes against humanity,12 and even genocide13 by the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals established to prosecute war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). The Rome Statue
that gave rise to the International Criminal Court incorporates many of
these advances and more, such as the inclusion of additional specific
gender-based crimes under the crimes against humanity provision. t4
Nevertheless, for the most part, the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals have approached sexual violence as constituting the actus
reus, or the material act, of the crime. A question that remains largely

10.

JEAN PICTET, CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

147-48 (1960).
11. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, IT-96-21-T, 9m475-96, 511,544 (Nov.
16, 1998) [hereinafter Celebici Trial Chamber Judgment] (affirming that sex crimes are covered
by the grave breaches provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in particular by the
prohibitions of "torture," "inhuman treatment," "willfully causing great suffering," and "serious
injury to body or health"); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, IT-95-17/1-T,
165 n.192,
172 (Dec. 10, 1998) [hereinafter Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment] (recognizing that rape
may amount to violation of common Article 3 and a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions);
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Judgment, IT-96-23-T & IT-96- 23/1-T, 436 (Feb. 22, 2001)
[hereinafter Kunarac Trial Chamber Judgment] (noting jurisdiction to prosecute rape as a
violation of common Article 3 is "clearly established").
12. See, e.g., Kunarac Trial Judgment, supra note 11, at 539-43 (recognizing rape as
well as contemporary forms of slavery, such as sexual slavery, as crimes against humanity);
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu
Trial Judgment].
13. See, e.g., Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 12, 731 (recognizing that "rape
and sexual violence ... constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they
were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group,
targeted as such").
14. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17,
1998, art 7(g), 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]
(giving the ICC jurisdiction over the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, "and any other forms of sexual violence
of comparable gravity").
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unexplored is whether the systematic and/or widespread use of rape and
other forms of sexual violence tells us anything about a perpetrator's
mental state. In other words, can the mens rea, or mental element of
these crimes, particularly of genocide, be inferred, at least in part, from
pattern evidence of sexual violence? The question is significant
because it may affect how crimes that disproportionately affect women
are charged-and therefore, whether and how they are investigated and
prosecuted.
The question is particularly relevant in light of the findings made last
year by the United Nations Commission of Experts tasked with
determining whether there was sufficient evidence to conclude that
genocide had occurred in the Darfur region of Sudan. Despite finding
that rapes had been used to terrorize, demoralize, and humiliate the
targeted population,15 the Commission concluded that there was not
enough evidence of genocidal intent. 16 Had the Commission considered
the question of what pattern evidence of sexual violence tells us about
a perpetrator's intent, it might have come to a different conclusion.
Indeed, the failure to consider this suggests that despite increased
accountability for crimes perpetrated exclusively or disproportionately
against women, there still seems to be a limited understanding of the
various functions that sex-based and gender-based violence can play,
particularly in times of conflict.
Sexual violence can function, as the landmark case of Akayesu
recognized, as a means by which to eventually destroy a particular
group of people. 7 Indeed, mass sexual violence can result (among
countless other injuries) in permanent gynecological injury to large
numbers of women in a particular group, thereby destroying their
capacity to reproduce, and perhaps even, the potential of the group to
15. Report of the InternationalCommission ofinquiry on Darfurto the United Nations
Secretary-General, 1 353, U.N. Doe. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/darfur.htm [hereinafter Darfur Commission of Inquiry Report]
(noting that the evidence collected by the Commission "indicate[s] that rape and sexual violence
have been used ... as a deliberate strategy with a view to achieve [sic] certain objectives,
including terrorizing the population, ensuring control over the movement of the IDP and
perpetuating its displacement.... [The evidence] demonstrates that rape was used as a means
to demoralize and humiliate the population.").
16. DarfurCommission of Inquiry Report, supra note 15,1518.
17. See, e.g., Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 12, 1 732 (recognizing that "sexual
violence was a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of the spirit,
of the will to live, and of life itself").
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survive. A poignant example of this is what happened to the "comfort
women" subjected to sexual slavery by the Japanese military in WWlI.
According to at least one commentator, a majority of these women
suffered such extensive damage to their reproductive organs as a result
of the abuses inflicted upon them that they lost their reproductive
capacity altogether.18
However, mass rape and other forms of sexual violence can, arguably, also function as a message to the targeted group. When committed on a mass scale and in certain patterns, such as in front of family
members or in public, sexual violence can communicate an intent to
destroy the very foundation of a particular group. This is particularly
true in social, cultural or religious communities where acts of sexual
violence not only shame and humiliate the victim and her family, but
also tear at the fabric of her entire community.
As Fionnuala Ni Aolain, a commentator who has written about sexbased violence and the holocaust, has noted-and here she was referring
to public nudity and the removal of bodily hair for selection into
concentration camps during WWlI-in certain types of contexts, there
is "no confusion between victim and perpetrator over the content of the
message."' 9 As she explains:
Taking away a woman's clothing and exposing her person to the gaze of
[unfamiliar] men was a crude and effective act of sexual violation. Nudity
in a public context was an abnormal and grotesque experience for these
women and the perpetrators understood that it would be experienced as such
by them.20

She further notes that because many of these women were religiously
observant, these acts were all the more shameful and humiliating.2' The
acts were, therefore, not only debasing but also intended to
communicate a message that was, as she notes, "organically linked to
the enterprise of cultural eradication in which destruction of the carriers
of the community was a central plank of policy."22 It seems plausible,
18. Kelly Askin, Jurisprudenceof InternationalCriminal Tribunals: Securing Justice
for Some Survivors, in LISTENING TO THE SILENCES: WOMEN AND WAR 125, 145-46 (Helen
Durham & Tracey Gurd eds., 2005).
19. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust-Reevaluationof
Harms and Rights in InternationalLaw, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 21 (2000).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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therefore, that when committed on a mass scale and in certain patterns,
sex-based and gender-based violence may have what Ni Aolain has
termed "communicative value," and as such, may have something to say
about the intent of the perpetrator.

I.

PROVING GENOCIDAL INTENT

The prosecution of genocide involves proving the two basic elements
of the offense: the actus reus, or the actual physical act or acts by which
genocide can be committed, and the mens rea, the perpetrator's
genocidal intent.23 It is this last element, the perpetrator's intent, that
has proven extremely difficult to demonstrate. Indeed, as mentioned
earlier, it was the problem of proof surrounding the mens rea element
of genocide that precluded the UN Commission of Experts from finding
that there had been a state policy of genocide in Darfur.24
The ad hoc international criminal tribunals have distilled the mens
rea of genocide into two major elements: (1) discriminatory intent,
whereby victims are targeted on account of their membership in a
protected group (e.g., a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group), and
(2) the specific intent to destroy the protected group in whole or in part.
Thus, proving genocidal intent demands a showing that perpetrators not
only targeted members of a protected group, but also that they did so
specifically seeking to destroy the group, in whole or in part. It is
generally not enough to show that an accused is aware that his acts will

23. The statutory provisions giving the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) jurisdiction to try the crime of genocide both use the
definition of genocide found in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, which defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S., available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/xlcppcg.htm [hereinafter
Genocide Convention].
24. See DarfurCommission ofInquiry Report, supranote 15,91518 and accompanying
text.
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result in the destruction of the group; 5 the accused must "seek to
achieve the destruction, in whole or in part, of a national, ethnical [sic],
racial or religious group, as such. 2 6 It is this specific intent that, in
from other crimes, such as the crime
part, is said to distinguish genocide
27
persecution.
of
against humanity
Recognizing the difficulty of proving genocidal intent, the ad hoc
tribunals have determined that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal
intent can be inferred from other "facts, the concrete circumstances, or
a 'pattern of purposeful action.' ' 28 Nevertherless, when inferential
evidence is relied upon to prove genocidal intent, the tribunals have
cautioned that the "inference must be the only reasonable inference
available on the evidence. ,29
The ad hoc tribunals have enumerated a number of relevant factors
when determining whether genocidal intent can be inferred from the
evidence, including speeches or statements condemning or disparaging
the targeted group, acts of violence against cultural symbols associated
with the group, other policies of discrimination against members of the
group, sheer number of victims/scale of atrocities, the repetitive and/or
systematic nature of the abuses against the particular group, and the

25. See Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 85 (Dec. 14, 1999)
[hereinafter Jelisic Trial Judgment] (rejecting prosecution's argument that genocide exists where
a defendant "knows that his acts will inevitably, or even only probably, result in the destruction
of the group in question"). See also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T,
Judgment, 656 (Jan. 17, 2005).
46 (July 5, 2001)
26. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment,
[hereinafter Jelisic Appeals Judgment].
79. See also International Law
27. Jelisic Trial Judgment, supra note 25,
Commission, 6 May-26 July 1996, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the work
of its forty-eigth session, UN Doc. A/51/10, at 87-88 (1996) (identifying genocide's specific
intent as the " distinguishing characteristic of this particular crime under international law").
28. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 704 (Sept. 1,
2004) [hereinafter Brdjanin Trial Judgment], citingProsecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgment, 526 (July 31, 2003) [hereinafter Stakic Trial Judgment]. See also Prosecutor v.
Krstic, Case No: IT-98-33-A, Judgment, "91 33-34 (Apr. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Kristic Appeals
47; Prosecutor v. Kayishema &
Judgment]; Jelisic Appeals Judgment, supra note 25,
Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), 1 159 (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter
Kayishema Appeals Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment
& Sentence, 1 63 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Rutaganda Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor v.
Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95- I-T, Judgment, 9193 (May 21, 1999) [hereinafter
Kayishema Trial Judgment].
29. Kristic Appeals Judgment, supra note 28,9141.
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brutality or gratuity of the violence employed.3 ° Significantly,
genocidal intent can also be inferred from "the perpetration of acts
which violate, or which perpetrators themselves consider to violate, the
very foundation of the group.. .,,3' Thus, the character and the nature
of the acts in question, as well as the manner in which they are carried
out, can constitute strong evidence of intent. However, few cases have
recognized the existence of systematic sexual violence as evidence of
genocidal intent.
One notable exception to this is a decision in the case of Prosecutor
v. Karadzic & Mladic. 32 There, the ICTY found that the specific nature
of the means used to achieve the objective of what the tribunal termed
"ethnic cleansing" in the Bosnian conflict, including the systematic rape
of women, tended to show that the acts were designed to reach "the very
foundations of the group. 33 Noting that the systematic rape of women
was in some cases committed to "transmit a new ethnic identity to the
child" and in others to "dismember the group" through terror and
humiliation, the Tribunal concluded that in combination with other
factors, the systematic rape of the kind perpetrated during the Bosnian
conflict could provide evidence of genocidal intent.34
In light of the mass scale, the extremely public and humiliating nature
of the rapes, and the systematic manner in which acts of sexual violence
were reportedly committed against Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
women during the Bosnian conflict, 35 it seems reasonable that the
Tribunal would have come to this conclusion. Indeed, the character and

30. See, e.g., Kristic Appeals Judgment, supranote 28, 133; Jelisic Appeals Judgment,
supra note 27, 47; Kayishema Trial Judgment, supra note 25, 93; Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, 580 (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Kristic Trial Judgment];
Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 12, 1523.
31. Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case nos. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review
of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 94 (July 16,
1999) [hereinafter Karadzic & Mladic Rule 61 Decision].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. IN94-95.
35. Id. at 64; Rape andAbuse of Women in the Areas ofArmed Conflict in the Former
Yugoslavia, G.A. Res. 48/143, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/143 (Jan. 5, 1994); Rape and Abuse of
Women in the Areas ofArmed Conflict in the FormerYugoslavia, G.A. Res. 49/205, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/49/205 (Mar. 6, 1995); Rape andAbuse of Women in the Areas ofArmed Conflict in the
Former Yugoslavia, G.A. Res. 50/192, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/192 (Feb. 23, 1996); Rape and
Abuse of Women in the Areas of Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, G.A. Res. 51/115,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/115 (Mar. 7, 1996).
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the nature of the acts, as well as the manner in which they were carried
out, indicate that they were likely linked to the aim of destroying or
violating "the very foundation of the [victims'] group. 36
Similarly, in the Rwandan conflict, Tutsi women were raped in
public, gang raped, and raped using recurring methods, such as with
foreign objects or in specially humiliating ways.3 7 As the Trial
Chamber in Akayesu described, "acts of rape and sexual violence...
were committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were
subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several
times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other
public places, and often by more than one assailant... "38
These patterns show that this was not the kind of rape that some
would argue accompanies the lawlessness that exists in times of
conflict. The accounts of many of the victims from the conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda suggest that these rapes were conducted
in a systematic manner under a plan conceived to wipe out the victims'
group. As the Tribunal in Akayesu noted, the "rapes resulted in the
physical and psychological destruction of the Tutsi women, their
families and their communities. ' 39 Recognizing the devastating impact
of sexual violence, the Tribunal concluded that the "sexual violence was
a step in the process of destruction of the Tutsi group - destruction of
the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself."'
II. "COMMUNICATIVE VALUE" OF PATTERN EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE

Although the Tribunal in Akayesu did not use evidence of sexual
violence in its analysis of genocidal intent, the context and manner in

36. See Sharon A. Healey, ProsecutingRape under the Statute of the War Crimes
Tribunalforthe former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 327, 339 (1995) (noting that in the
Bosnian conflict, rape was "used not only as an attack on the individual victim, but [was]
intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire ethnic group").
37. For an account of the sexual violence perpetrated against Tutsi women during the
Rwandan conflict see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence During the
available at
Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath (1996),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm.
38. Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 12, 731.
39. Id.
40. Id. 1732.
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which the rapes were committed suggests that the rapes themselves had
what Ni Aolain has termed "communicative value."'"
Not only did the rapes often result in severe physical injuries,
sometimes causing permanent gynecological injury and destroying
women's capacity to reproduce, but some rapes also resulted in what
both victim and perpetrator considered to be children of a new
ethnicity.42 In patriarchal societies, such as in the Balkans, where the
family name passes through the male, the perpetrators of rape no doubt
knew that the victim and her community would experience forced
pregnancy as a way to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child.43
Perpetrated on a systematic scale, this pattern arguably provides
persuasive evidence of an intent to "violate the very foundation of the
group.""
Second, having lived among many of their victims in societies which
place a high value on the chastity and purity of women, the perpetrators
no doubt knew and understood that women raped or impregnated as a
result of rape would likely be viewed in their own community as
"tainted" and/or unworthy of marriage. There were reports, for
instance, coming out of the former Yugoslavia that some husbands
abandoned their wives after learning that they had been raped. 45 The
public and systematic nature of these rapes, resulting in what
perpetrators no doubt assumed would be the rejection and ostracizing
of the victims by their families and communities, arguably
communicated a clear message that the perpetrators intended to destroy
not only the individual victim's physical and mental integrity, but also
the group's internal cohesion and capacity to exist as such. Although
Akayesu found this pattern to be evidence that the rapes constituted
"genocide in the same way as any other act"46 rather than as evidence
of intent, the analysis demonstrates the communicative value of group

41. Ni Aolain, supra note 19, at 63.
42. See, e.g., Karadzic & Mladic Rule 61 Decision, supra note 31, 64.
43. Id.
44. Id. 94.
45. Healey, supra note 36, at 340 (describing that in some instances "rape survivors
who have spoken about being raped were asked to leave the community because the community
did not want to be known as being a community of 'raped women'); see also Karadzic &
Mladic Rule 61 Decision, supra note 31, 1 94.
46. Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra note 12, 1 731 (emphasis added).
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destruction that accompanies the perpetration of sexual violence in these
kinds of circumstances.
Indeed, as the Tribunal noted in the Karadzic & Mladic Decision, the
fact that the rapes were "performed with an effort to displace civilians
and to increase the shame and humiliation of the victims and of the
...
community in order to force them to leave" was seen as evidence of a
clear link to the intended policy of "ethnic cleansing."47 The nature of
these acts, in combination with the speeches justifying them and the
massive scale of their destructive effect, was thus deemed sufficient
evidence from which genocidal intent could be derived.4"
III. Is PATTERN EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE ENOUGH TO SHOW
INTENT TO DESTROY "IN WHOLE OR IN PART"?

However, genocidal intent requires the intent to destroy a group, in
whole or in part. Is violating the reproductive capacity of women in a
certain community and tearing at the social fabric of that community
through humiliation and terror sufficient to show an intent to destroy a
group, "in whole or in part"?
Although there is still much debate about the meaning of that phrase,
the ICTY Appeals Chamber made clear in the Kristic case that "where
a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to destroy a group 'in
part,' the part must be a substantial part of the group."49 The Chamber
went on to explain that the "part targeted must be significant enough to
have an impact on the group as a whole. 5° In assessing whether the
targeted part of the group is substantial enough to meet this standard,
the Chamber highlighted the need to consider not only the number of
people targeted, but also the prominence within the group of the part
targeted. 5' Elaborating on this last factor, the Chamber noted that "[i]f
a specific part of the group is ...essential to its survival, that may
support a finding that the part qualifies as substantial."52

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Karadzic & Mladic Rule 61 Decision, supra note 31,
Id.9H 64, 95.
Kristic Appeals Judgment, supra note 28, 8.
Id.
Id.[ 12.
Id.

64.
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Whether the destruction of a particular part of a group would have
the necessary impact on the entire group's viability will, therefore,
depend on the circumstances of each case. However, it is certainly
arguable that destroying the lives and/or reproductive capacity of a
significant number of women of a particular group may threaten the
future survival of that particular group. Committing crimes against
women of a protected group on a mass scale could, therefore, be strong
evidence of the intent to commit genocide.
Although the ICTY Appeals Chamber ultimately reversed the Trial
Chamber's genocide conviction in the Kristic case, the Appeals
Chamber came to a similar conclusion with respect to the potential
long-term impact of the destruction of part of a group on the group's
reproductive capacity and therefore, potential to survive.53 As the
Camber noted,
The Trial Chamber was... entitled to consider the long-term impact that the
elimination of seven to eight thousand men from Srebrenica would have on
the survival of that community. In examining these consequences, the Trial
Chamber properly focused on the likelihood of the community's physical
survival. As the Trial Chamber found, the massacred men amounted to about
one fifth of the overall Srebrenica community. The Trial Chamber found that,
given the patriarchal character of the Bosnian Muslim society in Srebrenica,
the destruction of such a sizeable number of men would "inevitably result in
the physical disappearance of the Bosnian Muslim population at Srebrenica."
Evidence introduced at trial supported this finding, by showing that, with the
majority of the men killed officially listed as missing, their spouses are
unable to remarry and, consequently, to have new children. The physical
destruction of the men therefore had severe procreative implications for the
Srebrenica Muslim community, potentially consigning the community to
extinction.'

The Appeals Chamber went on to conclude,
[t]his is the type of physical destruction the Genocide Convention is designed
to prevent. The Trial Chamber found that the Bosnian Serb forces were aware
of these consequences when they decided to systematically eliminate the
captured Muslim men. The finding that some members of the VRS Main
Staff devised the killing of the male prisoners with full knowledge of the
detrimental consequences it would have for the physical survival of the
Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica further supports the Trial

53.
54.

Id.
Id. 1 28 (citations omitted).
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Chamber's conclusion that the instigators of that operation had the requisite
genocidal intent.55

Similarly, the perpetrators of mass rape in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda had to be aware of the long-lasting impact sexual violence
would have not only on individual women, some of whom were killed
following the acts of sexual violence, but also on the capacity of the
community as a whole to survive. Destruction of a significant part of
the group, through physical and psychological injuries, social stigmatization and isolation, as well as the communication of sexually
transmitted life-threatening diseases, could, therefore, constitute
compelling evidence of the intent to destroy the group as a whole.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO PERCEIVE PATTERN EVIDENCE OF
SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS EVIDENCE OF INTENT

The question, of course, is why does this matter? Why should we
worry about the use of systematic rape and sexual violence as evidence
of intent? One reason is that the way in which criminal conduct is
charged and prosecuted matters. It matters not only because of the
symbolic value and the message that prosecuting such crimes as
genocide sends to both victims and perpetrators-that is, that crimes
perpetrated exclusively or disproportionately against women and girls
are just as serious as other offenses rising to the level of genocide 56 55. Id. 29 (citations omitted).
56. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals has been inconsistent on the question of
whether genocide should be considered more serious than other international crimes. Compare
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, Judgment, 9153 (July 9, 2004) (referring to
genocide as the "crime of crimes"); Stakic Trial Judgment, supra note 28, 502 ("recall[ing]
and adopt[ing] the description of genocide as 'the crime of crimes') with Kayishema Appeals
Judgment, supra note 28, 1367 (noting that "there is no hierarchy of crimes under the Statute,
and that all of the crimes specified therein are 'serious violations of international humanitarian
law,' capable of attracting the same sentence"). Nevertheless, commentators point out that
describing conduct as genocide rather than as war crimes or crimes against humanity continues
to carry weightier consequences. See, e.g., William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes against
Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission's Findings of Inquiry on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1703, 1717 (2006) (noting that "[liegal arguments aside, describing acts as genocide has
the consequence of stigmatisation to an extent that simply does not work in the same way with
respect to crimes against humanity"). Many commentators, in fact, still view genocide as
properly reserved for the "most heinous crime against humanity, namely the intentional physical
destruction of an ethnic group." Id. at 1720. See also Allison M. Danner, Constructing a
Hierarchyof Crimes in InternationalCriminalLaw Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415,483 (2001)
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but also because sanctions for perpetrators of genocide may be stiffer
than for perpetrators of other types of international crimes.57 Without a
full understanding of the various functions that sex-based and genderbased violence perpetrated on a mass scale can play, these crimes are
unlikely to be adequately investigated, charged or prosecuted.
As mentioned earlier, the report by the UN Commission of Experts
on Darfur is a good example of the possible consequences of failing to
consider pattern evidence of sexual violence in an analysis of genocidal
intent. The Commission found evidence of genocidal intent lacking.58
It could have examined whether the nature, scale and context in which
the sexual violence occurred in Darfur was intended to communicate a
message from which an intent to destroy the targeted group could be
inferred. However, it chose not to.
Indeed, the Commission's report failed to recognize the multiple
functions that rape can play in a genocidal scheme. As in Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia, the rapes committed in Darfur have been
described as "often flagrant, occurring in full view of many people."59
A recent report by Physicians for Human Rights suggests that, as in
these other conflicts, the tactic of raping women in front of family
members or "out in the open where people fleeing violence could see"
was used intentionally "to publicly humiliate the husbands and shame
the women, thus weakening familial and societal bonds." 6° In a society

("Genocide poses more harm than crimes against humanity or war crimes because of the explicit
intent to destroy a group, the discrimination animating the perpetrator's action, and the implicit
element of collective action inherent in the commission of the crime."). Significantly, the Rome
Statute reserves the crime of "direct and public incitement" for genocide, but not for crimes
against humanity and war crimes. Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 25(3)(e).
57. Again, though the practice of the tribunals has varied with respect to sentencing,
the ICTY has recognized that "[t]he seriousness of the crime must weigh heavily in the sentence
imposed irrespective of the form of the criminal participation of the individual." Celebici Trial
Chamber Judgment, supra note 12, 1225.
58. DarfurCommission of Inquiry Report, supra note 15,91518.
59. Physicians for Human Rights, DarfurAssault on Survival: A Callfor Security,
Justice and Restitution, 29 (2006).

60.

Id. at 30.
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where "a profound social stigma is attached to rape, ' 6' such conduct
could arguably be read as evidencing an intent to destroy the group.
Similarly, as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, identity is traced
through patrilineal lines in Darfurian Society.62 As a result, mass rape
can be used as a way to communicate an intention to transmit a new
63
identity to offspring and alter the ethnic composition of a community.
There have been reports, for instance, of rapes accompanied by
"statements made by the Janjaweedperpetrators suggesting their intent
to make a 'free baby' (implying that the non-Arabs are slaves) and to
'pollute' the tribal blood line. . ."' Although this pattern of sexual
violence may well suggest an intent to destroy the targeted group of
non-Arab tribes, this issue was not addressed by the Commission.65
Instead, the Commission focused its analysis of intent on the fact that
the perpetrators of the atrocities in Sudan targeted primarily young men
feared to be rebels or potential rebels' and concluded that the primary

61. Id. at 29. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War:
Sexual Violence anditsConsequences, § 4.1 (July 19,2004) [hereinafter Amnesty International,
Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War] ("The stigma attached to women who have been raped has
far-reaching social and economic consequences on the rape victims. Married women can be
'disowned' by their husbands, although this is not always the case. As for unmarried survivors
of rape, they may never be able to marry because they are stigmatized or considered to be
'spoiled' by their communities.").
62. Tara Gingerich & Jennifer Leaning, The Use of Rape as a Weapon of War in the
Conflict in Darfur, Sudan, 18, Harvard School of Public Health (Oct. 2004), available at
http://www.phrusa.org/research/sudan/pdf/report-rape-in-darfur.pdf.
63. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Darfur:Rape as a Weapon of War, supranote 61,
§ 4.1 ("In the specific social context of Darfur, in a society where rape is considered a taboo and
a shame for the survivor of this violence, the child who is a result of rape will mostly be
considered as a child of the 'enemy', a 'Janjawid child."'); Gingerich & Leaning, supra note
62, at 27 (noting that "[r]ape has been a critical element in the sweeping, scorched-earth
campaign launched by the Janjaweed and the GOS [Government of Sudan] against the non-Arab
Darfurians" and that "[i]n using rape as a weapon of war, the Janjaweed and GOS military have
sought to... tear apart the community by engaging in ethnic cleansing through 'pollution' of
the blood line and by breaking family and community bonds").
64. See, e.g., Gingerich & Leaning, supra note 62, at 18. See also Emily Wax, "We
Want to Make a Light Baby": Arab Militiamen in Sudan Said to Use Rape as Weapon of Ethnic
Cleansing, WASH. POST, June 30, 2004, at AO1; Samantha Power, It is Not Enough to Call it
Genocide, TIME MAG., Oct. 2004, at 1.
65. Although the Commission conceded that the systematic nature of rape, among other
factors, "could be indicative of genocidal intent," DarfurCommission ofInquiry Report,supra
note 15, 1 513, it offered no further analysis on this point and instead concluded that "there are
other more indicative elements that show the lack of genocidal intent." Id.
66. DarfurCommission of Inquiry Report, supra note 15, U 513-14.
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purpose of these attacks, as well as the forcible expulsion of large
sections of the population from their villages, amounted to "counterinsurgency warfare."67
In arriving at its conclusion that genocidal intent was lacking, the
commission pointed out that not everyone who was targeted was
killed.68 However, as the jurisprudence of the ICTY indicates, the
failure to kill every member of the group that the perpetrators have
access to does not necessarily negate other evidence of genocidal
intent. 69 As the Tribunal in Kristic pointed out:
In determining that genocide occurred at Srebrenica, the cardinal question is
whether the intent to commit genocide existed. While this intent must be
supported by the factual matrix, the offence of genocide does not require
proof that the perpetrator chose the most efficient method to accomplish his
objective of destroying the targeted part. Even where the method selected will
not implement the perpetrator's intent to the fullest, leaving that destruction
incomplete, this ineffectiveness alone does not preclude a finding of
genocidal intent.7"

In this case, the Commission could have explored whether the sexual
violence committed against women and girls in these villages, in
combination with the other abuses, indicated an intention to destroy the
group, but it chose not to. Indeed, the Commission chose not to examine
whether the systematic rape it characterized in an earlier part of the
report as a means to terrorize, demoralize and humiliate the population
was intended not only to harm the women but also to tear apart their
community, thereby providing persuasive evidence of intent on the part
of the perpetrators to eventually destroy the group. Had it done so, the
Commission might have reached a different conclusion.
Unfortunately, the report by the UN Commission of Experts on
Darfur is not the only example of the possible consequences of failing
to consider pattern evidence of sexual violence in an analysis of
genocidal intent. The case of Prosecutorv. Kunaracet al., heard by the
ICTY, provides another case in point. The indictment in that case
focused almost exclusively on sex-based and gender-related crimes

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. 518.
Id. 513.
Id. (9513-18.
Kristic Appeals Judgment, supra note 28, 1 32.
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7
committed in the town of Foca.7 ' The allegations
included gang rapes, 72
73
rapes in detention, rapes leading to permanent gynecological harm74
and rapes accompanied by statements such as you will "now give birth
to Serb babies., 75 The character and the nature of the acts in question,
as well as the manner and context in which they were carried out, might
well have been sufficient to permit an inference of genocidal intent.
However, genocide was not charged. Although recognized by many
commentators as a landmark indictment because of its near exclusive
focus on gender-based crimes, at least one commentator has concluded
that "It]he primary shortcoming of the indictment was the omission of
76

appropriate charges of genocide.,

Indeed, the prosecutor could have argued that the attempts of forcible
impregnation and the systematic nature of the rapes in Foca suggested
a clear link to a policy of destruction of the women and their associated
group. Had the nature, scale and context in which the sexual violence
occurred been recognized not only as evidence of criminal acts, but also
as evidence of intent, perhaps charges of genocide would have been
filed. As it was, the indictment was limited to crimes against humanity
and violations of the laws of war.77
V. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF RECOGNIZING PATTERN

EVIDENCE OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AS EVIDENCE OF INTENT
Some feminist scholars have argued that highlighting the harm to the

targeted group done by crimes committed against women of the group
risks diminishing the harm done to all women in a conflict, regardless
of the group to which they belong. 7 However, recognizing the many

71. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-PT, Third Amended Indictment
(Nov. 8, 1999) [hereinafter Kunarac Third Amended Indictment].
72. See, e.g., id. 5.3.
73. Id. 1.3.
74. Id.'l 1.8.
75. Id. 6.1.
76. Kelly Askin, Sexual Violence in Decision and Indictments of the Yugoslav and
Rwandan Tribunals: CurrentStatus, 93 AM. J. INT'LL. 97, 119 (1999). Although Askin was
referring to the original indictment in the case, the amended indictment retains many of the
same types of allegations from which an intent to destroy could be inferred.
77. Kunarac Third Amended Indictment, supra note 71.
78. Karen Engle, Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT'LL. 778, 785-86 (2005) (summarizing debate among
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functions sexual violence perpetrated on a mass scale against a particular group can play arguably does quite the opposite. Acknowledging
the dual functionality of rape and sexual violence as being relevant to
proving both the pervasive extent to which women are harmed during
these conflicts and the mental state of a perpetrator accused of genocide
may help to more accurately describe the multiple harms that women
and their communities experience, and to ensure that, unlike in the case
of Kunaracand the report by the UN Commission of Experts on Darfur,
the harms are fully investigated, considered, and sanctioned in an
appropriate way.
A more powerful contention, and one that deserves some attention,
is that not all women who suffered sexual violence in these conflicts
were shamed, ostracized, or rejected by their communities. In fact, a
recent article on wartime rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina notes that when
one survivor was asked whether she felt shame or guilt because of what
happened to her, she responded "The shame is theirs, not mine. 7 9
Nevertheless, very rarely do prosecutors have smoking-gun evidence of
genocidal intent, and when the facts support an inference of intent with
respect to a particular defendant, those facts should not be ignored.
While care must be taken not to exaggerate claims or to allow the
trauma that victims experience to define them or their communities in
an overstated way, survivors of rape and sexual violence deserve to
have the injuries they and their communities have suffered recognized
and remedied as fully as possible.
CONCLUSION

I would submit that sex-based and gender-based violence committed
in times of conflict or mass violence may, under certain circumstances,
have "communicative value" and, as such, may have something to say
about a perpetrator's mental state. In light of the extraordinary progress
made in the last decade regarding the recognition of sexual violence as
an international crime, this may be a propitious moment to take stock
of these advances while also examining more closely how crimes
committed against women and their communities can be more

feminists scholars about "whether a focus on genocidal rape [in the Bosnian conflict] functioned
to downplay the extent to which all women raped during war were victims").
79. Id. at 796, n.107.
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appropriately sanctioned. Recognizing the many functions sexual
violence can play in times of conflict, including the "communicative
value" of such conduct, may help ensure that such crimes are adequately investigated and prosecuted.
On a final note, it is important to recognize that minimizing missed
opportunities requires more than a creative interpretation of the law. It
requires the will to interpret and implement that law in a way that
effectively responds to the crimes committed. Although there has been
overwhelming evidence of the systematic raping of women in nearly
every conflict that has occurred since the beginning of time, those
tasked with investigating, prosecuting and adjudicating culpability for
such crimes have rarely been women. Though the record is improving,
one need look no further than the tribunal set up in Iraq to try Saddam
Hussein and other members of his regime. Despite "Iraq's long
tradition of women in public life, dating back to the monarchy, and
continuing into the Saddam years," '0 it appears that not a single judge,
prosecutor or defense attorney involved in the tribunal is a woman.81
Although certainly no guarantee, recent experience has shown that
the participation of women in war crimes tribunals can make a
difference. The early experience of the ICTY and ICTR is instructive.
Sexual violence charges did not appear in many of the original
indictments brought before these tribunals.82 Significantly, it was not
until female judges-Judge Elizabeth Odio-Benito in the case of the
ICTY and Judge Navantham Pillay in the case of the ICTRhighlighted the absence of such charges to the parties litigating before
them that the indictments were amended to include charges of sexual
violence.83
Taking into account some of the lessons learned from the ICTR and
ICTY, the Statute of the International Criminal Court requires that, in
the selection of judges, prosecutors and other staff, the need for legal
expertise on gender-related crimes be taken into account.' This lesson

80. See, e.g., Simone Monasebian, Sex Matters: The Invisibility of Women at the Iraqi
Tribunal,Jan. 30, 2006, availableat http://www.law.case.edu/saddarntrial/entry.asp?entryid
=72.
81. Id.
82. Richard Goldstone & Estelle Dehon, EngenderingAccountability: Gender Crimes
Under InternationalLaw, 19 NEw ENG. J. PUB. POL'Y 121, 123-24 (2003).
83. Id.
84. Rome Statute, supra note 15, arts. 36(8) and 44(2).
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should apply not only to the ICC, but also to all other international or
internationalized efforts to hold perpetrators accountable for atrocities
committed in times of armed conflict or mass violence. Until then, we
risk missing critical opportunities to bring justice to victims of genderbased and sex-based crimes and their communities.

